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ARABIC / ISLAMIC PHILOSOPHY IN THOMAS AQUINAS’S
CONCEPTION OF THE BEATIFIC VISION IN
IV SENT., D. 49, Q. 2, A. 11
RICHARD C. TAYLOR
Marquette University / De Wulf-Mansion Centre
Milwaukee, Wisconsin / Katholieke Universiteit euven

T IS WELL KNOWN that philosophical texts and ideas,
analyses and arguments, rom the Arabic/Islamic philosophical
tradition exercised in luence upon the development o
theological and philosophical thinking in Latin Europe in the
twel th and thirteenth centuries and beyond. But too o ten the
positive aspects o this in luence have been eclipsed by the
emphasis modern scholars have put upon the writings o Latin
theologians arguing against reasoning received in the works o
Avicenna, Averroës, and others o the classical rationalist philosophical tradition in Islam.2 Frequently that emphasis has had its
own ideological ends, yielding results that have inappropriately led
to the dismissal o the importance o the arguments and insights

I

1

A dra t o this paper was presented at the annual Spring con erence sponsored by the
Commissio eonina and the Aquinas and ‘the Arabs’ Project, “Thomas d’Aquin et ses sources
arabes / Aquinas and ‘the Arabs’” held at the Bibliothèque du Saulchoir 27-28 March 2009.
I bene itted rom comments and questions raised there and elsewhere I have presented dra ts
o this article. I also bene itted rom the comments o an anonymous evaluator or The
Thomist. This article is a product o the Aquinas and ‘the Arabs’ Project. For in ormation see
www.AquinasAndTheArabs.org.
2
The Jewish rabbi, theologian, and philosopher Moses Maimonides, who wrote his
amous Guide for the Perplexed in Arabic, was schooled in the Arabic / Islamic philosophical
tradition and ollowed methods o philosophical analysis set orth by Al-F~r~b§, Avicenna,
Averroës and others o that tradition. To that extent, his philosophical work, although
distinctive, can reasonably be included as part o the classical rationalist Arabic / Islamic
philosophical tradition.
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o Muslim and Jewish thinkers o the shared Abrahamic traditions
o monotheism.3
Among the multiple purposes o the collaboration o the
Aquinas and ‘the Arabs’ Project and the Commissio eonina are (1)
the presentation o a sound and accurate understanding o the
value o the contributions o thinkers rom the Arabic / Islamic
tradition to the development o the theology and philosophy o
Thomas Aquinas and other thinkers o his era and later in Europe;
and (2) the proper appreciation and clear articulation o insights,
concerns, and issues common among medieval thinkers o the
Abrahamic traditions.4 This paper highlights and explicates an
important contribution o the Arabic / Islamic philosophical
tradition to the theology o Aquinas. At the very heart o his
theology o the ultimate end o human existence in the beati ic
vision or seeing God’s ace—expressed by Aquinas as seeing God
“ ace-to- ace” or seeing him “in essence” (facie ad faciem or per
essentiam)5—in his earliest major theological work, the
Commentary on the Sentences of Peter ombard,6 Aquinas chose
3

I have particularly in mind here, or example, the polemical treatment o the
development o metaphysics in the Arabic / Islamic tradition ound in Etienne Gilson’s Being
and Some Philosophers (Toronto: Ponti ical Institute o Mediaeval Studies, 1949).
4
For details on this project, see www.AquinasAndTheArabs.org. Although thinkers o the
Arabic tradition were o various ethnic backgrounds, Aquinas o ten speaks o them as ‘the
Arab philosophers” or “the Arabs.” The Aquinas and ‘the Arabs’ Project collaborates with the
Commissio eonina and holds two research con erences annually, in the Fall in North
America and in the Spring in Europe. For in ormation, see www.AquinasAndTheArabs.org
and click on Research Seminar Con erences.
5
While it seems clear enough in the objections and contras o the article treated here that
Aquinas regards these as synonymous phrases, he makes this per ectly clear in his own voice
in the response to objection 16 [22739]: “Set Deus per essentiam suam coniungibilis est
intellectui. Vnde non immediate uideretur, nisi essentia sua coniungeretur intellectui. Et hec
uisio immediata dicitur uisio aciei” (“But God is able to be joined to the intellect in essence.
Hence, he would not be seen immediately unless his essence were conjoined to the intellect;
this unmediated vision is called vision o the ace”).
6
This work was written in the period o 1251/52-1256. The best editions are S. Thomae
Aquinatis, Scriptum super libros Sententiarum magistri Petri ombardi episcopi Parisiensis, t.
1, ed. P. Mandonnet (Paris: P. Lethielleux, 1929); S. Thomae Aquinatis, Scriptum super libros
Sententiarum magistri Petri ombardi episcopi Parisiensis, t. 2, ed. P. Mandonnet (Paris: P.
Lethielleux, 1929); S. Thomae Aquinatis, Scriptum super libros Sententiarum magistri Petri
ombardi episcopi Parisiensis, t. 3, ed. M. F. Moos (Paris: P. Lethielleux, 1956); S. Thomae
Aquinatis, Scriptum super libros Sententiarum magistri Petri ombardi episcopi Parisiensis, t.
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to draw upon the philosophers o the Arabic tradition in his
explication o the nature o the key Christian theological issue o
ultimate human happiness in the li e to come.7
While the role played by the philosophers o the Arabic
tradition is evident in the ormation o the thought o Aquinas on
4, ed. M. F. Moos (Paris: P. Lethielleux, 1947); and Sancti Thomae Aquinatis, Opera omnia,
t. 7/2, Commentum in quartum librum Sententiarum magistri Petri ombardi (Parma; Typis
Petri Fiaccadori, 1858). Also see A. Oliva, es débuts de l'enseignement de Thomas d'Aquin
et sa conception de la “sacra doctrina”. Édition du prologue de son “Commentaire des
Sentences” de Pierre ombard.,Bibliothèque Thomiste 58(Paris: J. Vrin, 2006), 303-40; and
P. M. Gils “Textes inédits de st. Thomas: Les premières rédactions du ‘Scriptum super tertio
Sententiarum’,” Revue des sciences philosophiques et théologiques 45 (1961): 201-28; 46
(1962): 445-62, 609-28. The edition o the Sentences in the our volumes by Mandonnet and
Moos is incomplete since it does not include the second hal o Book IV. For this inal portion
o the work one would normally consult the Parma edition. However, the text is included in
the edition o the Summa Theologiae published in Ottawa (1943), v. 5, pp. 446b-454a as
Supplementum, q. 92, a. 1. I am grate ul to Dr. Adriano Oliva, O.P., o the Commissio
eonina, or providing a superior unpublished provisional text o this article rom the ourth
book o the Commentary on the Sentences, a work which is not yet critically edited. Readers
should note that, since I am using an unpublished version o the text, I will indicate sections
o this article with the square bracketed text numbers provided in the online version o the
Scriptum super Sententiis provided by Enrique Alarcón at http://
www.corpusthomisticum.org/snp40492.html. My text, however, on occasion di ers rom that
online version. My quotations o the Latin o that article are rom the superior unpublished
version.
7
In saying this I merely echo what has been stated by J.-P. Torrell, O.P., regarding the
importance o this issue in his study,“La vision de Dieu ‘per essentiam’ selon Saint Thomas
d’Aquin,” View and Vision in the Middle Ages - Micrologus. Nature. Science and Medieval
Soceties V (Florence: Edizioni SISMEL-Il Galluzzo, 1997), 43-68; reprinted in J.-P. Torrell,
O.P., Recherches Thomasiennes. Études revues et augmentées (Paris: Vrin, 2000), 177-97: “En
réalité, la vision de Dieu est au coeur de sa théologie et il en traite comme du ressort même
de la vie chrétienne” (“In reality the vision o God is at the heart o his theology and he treats
it as alling within the Christian li e” [196]). In a valuable 2006 study o IV Sent., d. 49, q. 2,
a. 1, J.-B. Brenet o ers similar remarks in an analysis more ocused on philosophical issues.
He writes, “Thomas place lui-même au coeur de sa conception de la vision béati ique la pièce
centrale d’un dispositi noétique intégralement philosophique que, par ailleurs, il entend et
prétend démonter et détruire” (“Thomas himsel places at the heart o his conception o the
beati ic vision as centerpiece a noetic system integrally philosophical that, nevertheless, he
understands and claims to demonstrate and destroy”) (“Vision béati ique et séparation de
l’intellect au début du XIVe siècle: Pour Averroès or contre Thomas d’Aquin?” in es
sectatores Averrois: Noétique et cosmologie aux XIIIe – XIVe siècles,ed. Dragos Calma and
Emanuele Coccia, Freiburger Zeitschrift für Philosophie und Theologie 53 [2006]: 310-42, at
329). Brenet’s work is in part prompted by Charles J. Ermatinger’s article, “Giles o Rome
and Anthony o Parma in an Anonymous Question on the Intellect,” Manuscripta 17 (1973):
91-115.
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the beati ic vision, or Aquinas this issue is irst and oremost a
theological issue arising rom various accounts o the accessibility
or inaccessibility o the “ ace” o God to human beings in patria,
that is, in the next li e in heaven. In this article o his Commentary
on the Sentences we ind Aquinas composing his analysis in the
a termath o the condemnations o 1241 when William o
Auvergne, bishop o Paris, condemned the proposition that the
divine essence cannot be seen by angels or human beings.8 Aquinas
ollows this guidance and rejects a view inspired by the
Neoplatonism o Dionysius and John Scot Eriugena, an understanding more common in Eastern Orthodox Christianity, that the
divine nature itsel is ultimately hidden rom creaturely view and
essentially transcends human experience.9 Although we shall see
Aquinas mention Avicenna only brie ly, earlier theologians had
used the best philosophical science o their day, the philosophy o
Avicenna, to reason that the divine essence itsel is beyond direct
human vision.10 In contrast, Aquinas insists that the scriptural
account asserting the direct intellectual vision o God be taken as
true and not subject to any interpretive diminution or watering
down as allegorical, symbolic, and so orth.11 Furthermore, while
ully recognizing that or Western Christianity this is a tenet o
aith, Aquinas still insists that its meaning can be cogently,
rationally, and coherently explicated through use o the
philosophical sciences o metaphysics and rational psychology. In
this there are two things to note regarding his methodic use o
philosophy in theological reasoning. First, here we ind Aquinas
clearly using philosophical reasoning rom the Arabic tradition to
re ute a theological teaching condemned in 1241 which he
believed to be incorrect, in this case the doctrine held by some
8

Torrell, “La vision de Dieu ‘per essentiam’,” 178.
Ibid., 178-80.
10
See the ine account by P.-M. de Contenson in “S. Thomas et l'avicennisme latin,” in
Revue des sciences philosophiques et theologiques 43 (1959): 3-31; and “Avicennisme latin et
vision de Dieu au début du xiiie siècle,” Archives d'histoire littéraire et doctrinale du Moyen
Âge 34 (1959): 29-97. In the latter article (at 49-51) de Contenson also discusses the role o
David o Dinant in the controversy leading up to the condemnation o 1210.
11
See Torrell, “La vision de Dieu ‘per essentiam’,” 178-79 on the contradictory passages
o Scripture on this issue.
9
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who deny that human beatitude can consist in the veritable
knowing o the divine essence. In this way he makes it clear that
philosophical methods have a place in the evaluation o
theological reasoning. Second, we also ind that in his theology
Aquinas unhesitatingly employs philosophical argumentation rom
the Arabic tradition o philosophy and rom that tradition extracts
the very principal key to his explication o human beatitude in the
intellectual apprehension and understanding o the essence o
God, the intellectual vision o God “ ace-to- ace.”
This is obviously remarkable or the understanding o the truly
essential importance o philosophy in the ormation o theological
doctrine.12 But it is perhaps even more remarkable and worthy o
special note that the solution o the issues at stake here Aquinas
ound only through his care ul study o the thought o the
philosopher and Muslim jurist Averroës in the ong Commentary
on De Anima.13 There Averroës set orth his controversial doctrine
that intellectual understanding on the part o individual human
beings comes about only by means o separately existing
immaterial intellects, the Agent Intellect and the Material Intellect.
On the account o Averroës, these separate intellects come to be
“in the soul” in human beings with the Agent Intellect as that by
which human beings themselves per orm the intellectual operation
o separation or abstraction and with the Material Intellect as that
which receives the abstraction now as an intelligible in act. It is in
virtue o these operations that human beings are denominated
rational animals.14 Yet it is also the case that Aquinas amously
12
As Brenet remarks, this is quite contrary to the view o Gilson that philosophical
progress took place thanks to the richness o theological considerations in the thought o
Aquinas. See Brenet, “Vision béati ique et séparation de l’intellect,” 342.
13
On the importance o Averroës in this issue, see de Contenson, “S. Thomas et
l'avicennisme latin,” 26-28; Ed. H. Wéber, “Les apports positi s de la noétique d’Ibn Rushd
à celle de Thomas d’Aquin,” in Multiple Averroès. Actes du colloque internationale organisé
à lóccasion du 850e anniversaire de la naissance d’Averroès, Paris 20-23 septembre 1976
(Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 1978) 211-48, in particular 212-19; and J.-B. Brenet, “S’unir à
l’intellect, voir Dieu: Averroès et la doctrine de al jonction au coeur du thomisme,” Arabic
Sciences and Philosophy 21 (2011): 215-47.
14
This is discussed in detail in my article, “Themistius and the Development o Averroes’
Noetics,” in Medieval Perspectives on Aristotle's De Anima, ed. R. L. Friedman and J.-M.
Counet, Philosophes Médiévaux LVIII (Leuven: Peeters, 2013), 1-38. It is also discussed in
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rejects the doctrine o Averroës on the nature o human intellect
with detailed analyses ound in later works, most notably in his De
unitate intellectus contra averroistas, but also even at book 2,
distinction 17, question 2, article 1, o his Commentary on the
Sentences. How could Aquinas in this same work both accept rom
Averroës the model and analysis essential to his doctrine o the
human vision o God per essentiam and reject the account o
natural epistemology o Averroës rom which that model was
taken? This will require explanation.
My ocus here is on the critical consideration that Aquinas gives
to teachings o philosophers rom the Arabic tradition as providing
possible models or understanding how a separate substance, in
this case God, can be a proper object o knowledge on the part o
human beings in ultimate human beatitude or happiness in his
Commentary on the Sentences of Peter ombard, book 4,
distinction 49, question 2, article 1, “Whether the human intellect
is able to attain to the vision o God in his essence.”15
In what ollows, I irst provide (1) an explanation o what it
meant or the thinkers examined here to speak o knowing
separate substances. I then proceed to an analysis o the text o
Aquinas. This analysis is divided into two parts. (2) The irst part
concerns models rom the Arabic tradition rejected by Aquinas,
namely (2A) the models provided by the tenth-century Baghdad
philosopher al-F~r~b§ (d. 950) and the twel th-century Andalusian
philosopher Ibn B~jja / Avempace (d. 1139), and (2B) the model
provided by Ibn S§n~ / Avicenna (d. 1037). I then proceed to (3)
Aquinas’s account o Alexander o Aphrodisias (d. early 3d
century) and Ibn Rushd / Averroës (d. 1198). It is part o this latter
account o Alexander and Averroës that is embraced by Aquinas
my “Intellect as Intrinsic Formal Cause in the Soul according to Aquinas and Averroes,” in
The Afterlife of the Platonic Soul: Reflections on Platonic Psychology in the Monotheistic
Religions, ed. Maha El-Kaisy Friemuth and John M. Dillon (Leiden: Brill, 2009), 187-220 and
in the introduction to the English translation o the ong Commentary on the De Anima. For
the latter, see Averroes (Ibn Rushd) of Cordoba. ong Commentary on the De Anima of
Aristotle, trans. and intro. Richard C. Taylor, subeditor Therese-Anne Druart (New Haven:
Yale University Press, 2009), lxvi-lxxv.
15
A ull English translation o this text is available at http://academic.mu.edu/
taylorr/Aquinas_and_the_Arabs_Project_Translations/Welcome.html
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in his irst detailed explication o the nature o the beati ic vision,
o the scriptural notion o ultimate human happiness consisting o
the vision o God “ ace-to- ace” or “in his essence,” per essentiam.
In the course o my setting orth the analysis o Aquinas, it will
become clear that the accounts he gives o al-F~r~b§, Ibn B~jja,
Alexander, and Averroës came solely rom his study o the ong
Commentary on De Anima of Aristotle by Averroës. Aquinas’s
exposition o the model provided by Avicenna was available to
him in the works o Avicenna.16 Finally, I will provide (4) a
summary and a response to the question o how Aquinas could
both accept the model o Alexander and Averroës or his
supernatural epistemology o beatitude in patria and at the same
time reject that view or natural epistemology in via. I will
conclude with remarks on the understanding and use o insights
rom the Arabic tradition by Aquinas as a mani estation o an
ongoing project common to philosophical thinkers o the
Abrahamic traditions in the Middle Ages.
I. KNOWING SEPARATE SUBSTANCES
What is meant by the notion o knowing separate substances
in the Arabic tradition varies in details through all the accounts,
but must be understood against the background o Platonic and
Aristotelian thought. For Plato it meant knowledge by an
apprehension on the part o the rational soul o transcendent and
separately existing orms as the ousiai or essences ormally
imitated by things o the perceptible world o sensation.17 For
Aristotle it meant the attainment o intellectual understanding o
highest realities and ultimate causes as recounted in
Metaphysics 1.1-2 (980a22-983a23). Re erence to that account
seems to be present in Nicomachean Ethics 10.7-8 (1177a121179a33), where Aristotle speaks o the highest o two orms o
happiness achievable by human beings, the happiness o
16
Regarding the prominence o Avicenna in discussions o this issue, see the articles by de
Contenson mentioned in note 10.
17
The classic account o this in Plato’s Republic begins at 475e in book 5 and extends
through book 6.
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theoretical contemplation and the happiness o the li e o virtue.
The nature o the transcendent immaterial entities known is
indicated as immaterial in Physics 8 and is expressly explicated as
divine substance eternally active in intellectual sel -contemplation
in Metaphysics 12. These two views are in a certain way combined
in the Plotinian conception o transcendent Nous or Intellect as
the entity containing all the orms, a notion conveyed to the
Arabic tradition in the Plotiniana Arabica and in writings rom the
late Greek Neoplatonic tradition.18 The early Arabic philosophical
tradition sometimes ollowed a late Greek tendency to ind
harmony between the views o Plato and Aristotle, and it is under
this in luence that al-F~r~b§ constructed his metaphysical account
o emanation and intellection.19
A) al-F~r~b§
Combining the Plotinian notion o a separate intellect ull with
orms and the Aristotelian notion o an unmixed and causative
intellect in act (discussed in De Anima 3.5), al-F~r~b§ set orth a
doctrine o Agent Intellect as the last in an emanative hierarchy
reaching rom the First Cause (God) to the sphere o the moon.20
The understanding o intelligibles by the human intellect comes
about through abstraction or extraction o the intelligible in
potency rom what has been provided by the external and internal
senses o the individual human being. As al-F~r~b§ makes clear in
several other works, human intellectual understanding takes place

18

On the Plotiniana Arabica, see Peter Adamson, The Arabic Plotinus: A Philosophical
Study of the “Theology of Aristotle” (London: Duckworth, 2002). For a short account, see
Adamson’s “The Theology o Aristotle,” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer
2010 Edition), http://plato.stan ord.edu/archives/sum2010/entries/theology-aristotle/.
19
Recently, Marwan Rashed has argued against the traditional attribution to al-F~r~b§ o
the treatise On the Harmonization of the Opinions of the Two Sages; see his “On the
Authorship o the Treatise On the Harmonization of the Opinions of the Two Sages Atributed
to al-F~r~b§,” Arabic Sciences and Philosophy 19 (2009): 843-82.
20
See or example chap. 3 o Abã Nas. r al-F~r~b§, On the Perfect State (Mabadi' ara' ahl
al-madina al-f~d. ila), ed. and trans. Richard Walzer (Ox ord: Clarendon Press, 1985), 100104.
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thanks to “something” (shai’un m~)21 that is a power o abstraction
provided to the human soul by the Agent Intellect. With this
power the individual human being by means o its own intellect is
able to abstract or extract (intaza‘a) or trans er (naqala) the
intelligible rom its mode o existence as individual in the
particulars o sensory experience to the immaterial mode o
existence appropriate or intellectual understanding. In al-F~r~b§’s
account, the human receptive intellectual power called “material
intellect” in the Arabic tradition ( ollowing Alexander o
Aphrodisias), or later called “possible intellect” by Aquinas, is
responsible or the activity o abstraction inso ar as the rational
soul is made receptive o the intelligible as immaterial.22 When a
human being through study and reasoning has garnered
intelligibles in act or himsel in this way, that human being is able
to contemplate intellectually those intelligibles in himsel as what
al-F~r~b§ calls “acquired intellect” and as such begins to lose need
or body and senses. When all the intelligibles have been amassed
by the rational soul, the soul comes to ul illment and realization
o itsel as an intellectual substance, no longer needing the body,
and becomes like the Agent Intellect itsel , rising to be near the
level o the Agent Intellect.
21
Alfarabi. Risalah fi'l-) aql, ed. Maurice Bouyges, S.J., 2d ed. (Beyrouth: Dar el-Machreq
Sari, 1983), 12.7-9. Etienne Gilson recognized the important in luence o al-F~r~b§ on the
Latin tradition in his “Les sources greco-arabes de l'augustinisme avicennisant,” Archive
d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du moyen âge 4 (1929): 5-149, and published a Latin text o
De intellectu (115-26). However, Aquinas shows no evidence o employing the twel thcentury translation o this text in the article studied here but instead seems wholly dependent
on what he inds in Averroës. Furthermore, his teacher Albert the Great displays no
knowledge o this work by al-F~r~b§ in his De homine (ca. 1245), a work in which Aquinas
ound a natural epistemology which he made his own. This latter issue was the topic o my
presentation, “Albert the Great’s Account o Human Knowledge in his De homine: A
Concoction Formed rom the Writings o Avicenna and Averroes,” at the con erence
Translation and Transformation: Albert, between Aquinas and ‘the Arabs’, Institute o
Philosophy, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, 4-5 June 2012, which will appear in the
con erence proceedings. It is somewhat surprising that neither Aquinas in the Commentary
on the Sentences nor Albert in De homine evidence direct use o al-F~r~b§’s De intellectu.
22
On this, see my “Abstraction in al-F~r~b§,” Proceedings of the American Catholic
Philosophical Association 80 (2006) 151-68. More precisely, or Aquinas abstraction is carried
out by the combined work o the agent intellect acting and the possible intellect receiving,
both o which are intrinsic to the human soul.
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For al-F~r~b§, then, knowing separate substances consists in
knowing abstracted intelligibles, knowing the intellect o the
rational soul, and also knowing the immaterial Agent Intellect
inso ar as it is both (1) the provider to human beings o a power
by means o which abstraction is accomplished by human individuals and (2) the ultimate cause o all orms in the sublunar
realm.23 In its most transcendent orm, intellectual understanding
or knowing results in the individual human intellect or rational
part o the soul being at or near the level o the Agent Intellect. AlF~r~b§ even goes so ar as to say that this is the real meaning o the
religious notion o the a terli e.24 However, he does not hold that
knowledge o the Agent Intellect is a direct apprehension or epistemological conjoining. Aquinas gives no evidence o having read
this in the teachings o al-F~r~b§ and the account o this doctrine
in al-F~r~b§ by Averroës provides a di erent interpretation.
In the ong Commentary on De Anima Averroës reports a
second, more radical view al-F~r~b§ is said to have held in his lost
Commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics.25 On that reported
account, knowing separate intelligibles is something beyond
human abilities, though precisely what al-F~r~b§ meant cannot be
determined with certainty through the available indirect sources.26
23
This is the account o the Risalah fi'l-) aql, though al-F~r~b§ expresses di erent views in
other works. See my “Abstraction in al-F~r~b§,” 155-57 and the notes there or this doctrine
in the Mabadi' ara' ahl al-madina al-f~d. ila and al-Siy~sa al-madaniyya. The Risalah fi'l-) aql
is the work most relevant or the present discussion since it was a source used by Averroës in
the development o the doctrine o abstraction that was adopted by Aquinas.
24
Risalah fi'l-) aql, 30.9-31.9. In al-Siy~sa al-madaniyya, the Agent Intellect exercises care
or human beings so that they may “reach the highest ranks o the per ection which they can
attain, which is ultimate happiness. This comes to pass when the human being comes to the
rank o the Agent Intellect” (Al-F~r~b§’s The Political Regime [al-Siy~sa al-Madaniyya also
known as the Treatise on the Principles of Beings], ed. Fauzi M. Najjar [Beirut: Imprimerie
Catholicque, 1964], 32).
25
See Averrois Cordubensis Commentarium Magnum in Aristotelis De Anima ibros, ed.
F. S. Craw ord (Cambridge, Mass.: Medieval Academy o America, 1953), 433; Taylor, trans.,
ong Commentary on the De Anima, 345-46. Herea ter, re erences to the ong Commentary
will indicate the pages o the Latin edition by Craw ord in { } brackets.
26
On the source o this report, see Steven Harvey, “The Place o the Philosopher in the
City according to Ibn B~jjah,” In The Political Aspects of Islamic Philosophy: Essays in Honor
of Muhsin S. Mahdi, ed. Charles E. Butterworth (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press,
1992), 199-233. For a recent account o these and related issues, see Phillipe Vallat, Farabi
et l’École d’Alexandrie: Des prémisses de la connaissance à la philosophie politique (Paris:
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B) Ibn Bajja
For Ibn B~jja knowing separate substance takes place a ter the
rational soul has exercised its powers in various levels o
intellectual abstraction and inally attained a conjunctive
conjoining and uniting (ittis. ~l) with the transcendent Agent
Intellect, a process ultimately derived rom Plato’s account o
dialectical movement through ideas, in ideas, and to ideas in the
discussion o the Divided Line in book 6 o the Republic.27 Ibn
Bajja maintains that human beings exercise powers o abstraction
on various levels o normal human existence in the ormation o
notions more and more general, leading all the way up to the
sciences. But these abstractions can capture no more than what is
present in the imper ect individual orms which the human being
experiences, since none o these orms have the ullness o the
ideas they represent. To attain to the intelligible itsel one must
rise beyond the intermediary abstractions o the natural
philosopher to the apprehension o the intelligible itsel in the
ultimate intellect: “A human being irst has the spiritual orm
according to its various ranked kinds (‘alà mar~tibi-h~); then
through those he is in contact (yattas. ilu) with the intelligible; then
through that intelligible he has contact with this ultimate
intellect.”28 Subsequent to exercises o abstraction, then, the soul
must become intellect and rise through the dialectic o ideas to the
level o the Agent Intellect (or perhaps God) to achieve a unity
with it. For Ibn B~jja, the end o human existence is the attainment
Vrin, 2004).
27
See the edition o the Treatise on the Conjunction of the Intellect with Man in Ibn Bajja
(Avempace), a conduite de l’ isolé et deux autres épitres: Introduction, édition critique du
texte arabes. traduction et commentaire, ed. and trans. Charles Genequand (Paris: Vrin 2010)
194-96. This work is available in English translation in Classical Arabic Philosophy: An
Anthology of Sources, trans. Jon McGinnis and David C. Reisman (Indianapolis, Ind.:
Hackett, 2007), 269-83. For some discussion, see Alexander Altmann, “Ibn Bajja on Man’s
Ultimate Felicity,” in Harry Austryn Wolfson Jubilee Volume, 3 vols. (Jerusalem: American
Academy or Jewish Research, 1965), 1:47-87.
28
Treatise on the Conjunction of the Intellect with Man, 194. It seems that this should be
contact with God, though this is not completely clear. Still, what he writes later on (ibid.,
195) about the contemplation o the intelligible itsel in what is pure intellect being the end
o li e and highest happiness might support that view. Note that he mounts a substantial
de ense o a Platonic theory o orms against the critique o Aristotle (ibid., 198 .).
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o unity with the Agent Intellect (or God) as the attainment o a
level o divinity, and the means to this are the acts o intellectual
development.
C) Avicenna
For Avicenna, who based his own variation o the emanative
scheme on al-F~r~b§’s, the Agent Intellect is the cause o all the
orms emanated to constitute the things o the world and the
intelligibles known by human beings. For the rational soul,
knowing consists in what Avicenna variously characterizes using
the metaphors o conjoining (ittiis. ~l) with the separate Agent
Intellect or o emanation (fayd. ) received rom the separate Agent
Intellect in the apprehension o the intelligible orms o the world
which exist primarily in that Agent Intellect.29 According to the
teachings o Avicenna himsel , intellectual understanding takes
place in a coinciding two old process, beginning with the
preparation o the soul or the reception o orms by means o the
human abstractive process (tajr§d) cra ting prenoetic orms rom
particular experiences garnered by the external and internal senses
in the sublunar realm. When the soul is in this way suitably
prepared or disposed, the intelligible orm is then emanated rom
the Agent Intellect.
In this Avicenna combines the Aristotelian approach which
inds the oundations o knowledge in the sensory apprehension
o the orms o things with a Neoplatonic approach like that ound
in the Plotiniana Arabica which locates all intelligible essences in
transcendent intellect.30 The preparation o the soul is the
29
Both metaphors are used by Avicenna in close proximity in Avicenna’s De Anima (Arabic
Text) Being the Psychological Part of Kit~b al-Shif~’, ed. F. Rahman (London: Ox ord
University Press, 1959), 235-36; Avicenna atinus. iber De Anima seu Sextus de Naturalibus
IV-V, ed. S. Van Riet (Louvain: Editions Orientalistes; Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1968), 127-28. For
a general study o emanation in Avicenna, see Olga Lizzini, Fluxus (fayd. ). Indagine sui
fondamenti della metafisica e della fisica di Avicenna (Bari: Edizioni di Pagina, 2011).
However, Lizzini’s ocus is not primarily on epistemology and she provides only a modest
account o it.
30
See Cristina D’Ancona, “Degrees o Abstraction in Avicenna: How to Combine
Aristotle’s De Anima and the Enneads,” in Theories of Perception in Medieval and Early
Modern Philosophy (Helsinki: Springer, 2008), 47-71.
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particular human being’s exercise o the external and internal
senses in orienting the rational soul or its reception o
intelligibles, which can only truly come rom the Agent Intellect.
However, we must keep in mind that or Avicenna emanation
must be understood as a metaphor or a process he also describes
as a conjoining to the Agent Intellect.31 In his view, the rational
soul lacks intellectual memory, and so in each act o knowing the
soul must receive the emanation or make a conjoining again with
the Agent Intellect. In this context, knowing separate substances
as scienti ic knowledge o orms separate rom matter and
particularity consists in connecting with the Agent Intellect to
receive somehow an emanation o the intelligibles present in it.
This its well with Avicenna’s rejection o Aristotle’s view that
knowledge involves an identity o knower and known and with his
acceptance o a orm o representationalism.32 For Avicenna the
intelligibles that come to be in the human intellect are not the
unique orms themselves in the Agent Intellect but representations
o the orms that in some way share in or participate in a
derivative way those orms in the Agent Intellect or the
intelligible content they possess. Hence, as the orms constituting
the world literally must emanate rom the Agent Intellect, the
intelligible orms too must emanate rom the Agent Intellect to
account or human intellectual understanding. As we shall see,
Aquinas understood Avicenna in accord with the metaphor o
emanation.

31
Precisely how to understand the noetics o human intellect in Avicenna is a matter o
current controversy. What might be called the standard account is the emanationist view
espoused by Aquinas in his reading o Avicenna; see Herbert Davidson, Alfarabi, Avicenna,
and Averroes, on Intellect (Ox ord: Ox ord University Press, 1992). However, this has been
challenged. See Dimitri Gutas, “Intuition and Thinking: The Evolving Structure o Avicenna's
Epistemology,” in Aspects of Avicenna, ed. Robert Wisnovsky (Princeton: Markus Wiener
Publishers, 2001; reprinted rom Princeton Papers: Interdisciplinary Journal of Middle Eastern
Studies 9), 1-38; Dag Nikolaus Hasse, “Avicenna on Abstraction,” in ibid., 39-72; and the
novel approach to the issue in Jon McGinnis in “Making Abstraction Less Abstract: The
Logical, Psychological and Metaphysical Dimensions o Avicenna’s Theory o Abstraction,”
Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 80 (2006): 169-83.
32
Avicenna’s De Anima (Arabic Text), book 5, ch. 6 (Rahman, ed., 239-41; [Latin] van
Riet, ed., 134-38).
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D) Alexander of Aphrodisias
For Alexander o Aphrodisias in De intellectu, knowing
separate substance in intellectual understanding consists in the
ormal presence o the transcendent Agent Intellect (which he also
identi ies with God) in the perishable human soul or the
apprehension o intelligibles and the apprehension o that
presence.33 In his paraphrase o De Anima, Alexander also says
that the power o human intellectual understanding comes rom
outside, and is not a wholly intrinsic part o the human soul.34 As
we shall see, Averroës, the sole source o in ormation on the view
o Alexander or Aquinas on this issue (as discussed in the
Commentary on the Sentences), inds in Alexander as well as in
Themistius (who is not mentioned by Aquinas in this regard) the
doctrine o the ormal presence o the Agent Intellect in the
knowing human soul.
E) Averroës
From the time o his early Short Commentary on De Anima
(early 1160s) through the writing o the Middle Commentary
33
“This then [is what] the potential intellect, when it is being per ected and has developed,
thinks. For just as the power o walking, which a human being has as soon as he comes to be,
is led to actuality, as time advances, by being per ected itsel and not by being a ected in some
way, in the same way the [potential] intellect too when it has been per ected both thinks the
things that are intelligible by nature and makes sensible things intelligible to itsel , as being
productive” (Alexander o Aphrodisias, De Anima liber cum mantissa, ed. Ivo Bruns,
Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca, suppl. 2, pt. 1 [Berlin, 1887], 110.30-111.2; Alexander
of Aphrodisias: Supplement to On the Soul, trans. R. W. Sharples [London: Duckworth,
2004], 34-35). “The intellect that is by nature and rom without will assist that in us, because
other things too would not be intelligible, though being [so] potentially, i there did not exist
something that was intelligible by its own peculiar nature. This, being intelligible by its own
nature, by being thought comes to be in the one who thinks; it is intellect that has come to
be in the one who thinks, and it is thought ‘ rom without’ and [is] immortal, and implants in
the material [intellect] a disposition such that it thinks the things that are intelligible
potentially” (Bruns, ed., 111.28-32; Sharples, trans., 36-37).
34
Alexander, De Anima liber cum mantissa (Bruns, ed., 90.20-91.4); Alexandre
d’Aphrodise. De l’Âme, trans. Martin Bergeron and Richard Du our (Paris: Vrin, 2008), 213;
The De Anima of Alexander of Aphrodisias: A Translation and Commentary, trans. Athanasios
P. Fotinus (Washington, D.C.: University Press o America, 1980), 119-20.
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(perhaps ca. 1180-83) and right up through to the completion o
the inal version o the ong Commentary (perhaps 1186) each o
which went through various states o revision,35 Averroës
consistently held that the transcendent Agent Intellect plays an
important part in the realization o intellectual understanding on
the part o human beings, a view common to the Greek and Arabic
traditions. In all three works Averroës characterizes this role as
one in which Agent Intellect is s. urah la-n~, “ orm or us.”36 Such
a characterization in a general way is certainly appropriate, since
the tradition held commonly that a transcendent Agent Intellect
plays a role in the actualization o the ormal content o
intelligibles in the human mind. In his ong Commentary on De
Anima Averroës saw this doctrine o the Agent Intellect as “ orm
or us” in Alexander o Aphrodisias who held that perishable
individual human intellects are brought to completion in knowing
by the transcendent Agent Intellect, which Alexander identi ied
with the highest God.37 Averroës analyzed the teachings o
Themistius and also ound that this Greek commentator as well
holds that the transcendent Agent Intellect is “ orm or us.”38
However, the true meaning o the teaching becomes clear when
Averroës provides a critical analysis o the account o al-F~r~b§.
As indicated earlier, or al-F~r~b§ the Agent Intellect plays a
crucial role in human intellectual understanding and in the
35

On this matter, see Davidson, Alfarabi, Avicenna, and Averroes, on Intellect, 265-82; C.
Sirat and M. Geo roy, ’original arabe du Grand commentaire d’Averroès au De anima
d’Aristote. Prémices d’édition (Paris: J. Vrin, 2005); my introduction in Taylor, trans., ong
Commentary on the De Anima, xxviii-xlii; and my “Textual and Philosophical Issues in
Averroes’ ong Commentary on the De Anima o Aristotle,” in The etter before the Spirit:
The Importance of Text Editions for the Study of the Reception of Aristotle, ed. Aa ke M. I.
van Oppenraaij and Resianne Smidt van Gelder-Fontaine (Leiden and Boston: Brill,2012),
267-87.
36
See Richard C. Taylor, “The Agent Intellect as ‘Form or Us’ and Averroes’s Critique
o al-F~r~b§,” Topicos (Universidad Panamericana, Mexico City) 29 (2005): 29-51; reprinted
with corrections in Proceedings of the Society for Medieval ogic and Metaphysics 5 (2005):
18-32 (http://www. ordham.edu/gsas/phil/klima/SMLM/PSMLM5/PSMLM5.pd ). See also
Marc Geo roy, “Averroès sur l’intellect comme cause agent et cause ormelle, et la question
de la ‘jonction’ - I,” in Averroès et les averroïsmes juif et latin. Actes du colloque tenu à Paris,
16-18 juin 2005, ed. J.-B. Brenet (Turnhout: Brepols, 2007), 77-110.
37
Taylor, trans., ong Commentary on the De Anima, 385-87 {484-485}.
38
Taylor, trans., ong Commentary on the De Anima, 356 {445}.
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per ection o human substance at the highest levels by providing
“something” by means o which the human intellect is able to
per orm the activity o abstraction or trans erence o intelligibles
rom the level o intelligibles in potency in the human imagination
to the level o intelligibles in act in the individual human material
or receptive intellect.
However, according to Averroës the teaching o al-F~r~b§ was
that Agent Intellect is only an extrinsic e icient cause acting on
humans in such a way as to make possible abstraction and
intellectual understanding.39 The individual human being is not the
acting e icient cause in human intellectual understanding. As
Averroës puts it, the Agent Intellect’s “relation to a human being
will be only the relation o the agent to the human being, not a
relation o orm.”40 That is, it will be the Agent Intellect that
abstracts intelligible orms or the human intellect; this process
does not take place through an intrinsic ormal cause in the
individual human intellect. The reason or Averroës’ rejection o
this view is simply that he insists that the active power o
intellectual understanding must be “in the soul” (as Aristotle
himsel insists in De Anima 3.4.430a13: en t‘ psuch‘) and that it
must be present there as “ orm or us” or a orm belonging to
human beings by means o which human beings per orm the
activities o abstraction and intellectual understanding. I the
Agent Intellect does the abstracting, or provides orms through
emanation rom itsel , the human individual is not an agent willing
and acting in the ormation o knowledge. For Averroës, this
means, according to his novel doctrine, that the separately existing
Agent Intellect and separately existing Material Intellect must
come to be present as “in the soul” and must come to be powers
ormally belonging to the human being who initiates and carries
out the operations o abstraction and receptive intellectual
understanding. In an analysis o this elsewhere I have
characterized it as a orm o participation with the term,
39

I discuss the views o al-F~r~b§ in various works in “Abstraction in al-F~r~b§.”
Taylor, trans., ong Commentary on the De Anima, 401 {502}. Averroës understands
the account o al-F~r~b§ di erently rom the one I gave earlier o the “something” which the
Agent Intellect provides to the soul or carrying out abstraction.
40
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“Aristotelian participation.”41 Key to this is the ollowing assertion
by Averroës:
For because that in virtue o which something carries out its proper activity is the
orm, while we carry out {500} our proper activity in virtue o the agent
intellect, it is necessary that the agent intellect be form in us. . . . [I]t is necessary
that a human being understand all the intelligibles through the intellect proper
to him and that he carry out the activity proper to him in regard to all beings, just
as he understands by his proper intellection all the beings through the intellect
in a positive disposition [intellectus in habitu], when it has been conjoined with
orms o the imagination.42

Here Averroës criticizes al-F~r~b§ and asserts that one must hold
not that the Agent Intellect is an e icient cause acting on us, but
that it is “ orm or us” acting intrinsically in us since we are
ourselves knowers by our voluntary actions.43
Averroës himsel then clearly holds that the Agent Intellect
must be “ orm or us” such that it is somehow not merely extrinsic
but in some genuine sense intrinsically present in human knowers.
For him, the Agent Intellect is (1) “ orm or us,” as (2) intrinsic to
the human soul, and yet also (3) ontologically distinct in its own
eternal existence. Further, the Agent Intellect is (4) available to us
to be put in use by our will.44 Elsewhere I have argued that this
issue can be resolved i Averroës is understood to rame his
understanding in light o his study o Themistius and notions rom
the Neoplatonic tradition ound in Themistius.45 In his Paraphrase
41

See Taylor, “Themistius and the Development o Averroes’ Noetics,”
“Quoniam, quia illud per quod agit aliquid suam propriam actionem est orma, nos
autem agimus per intellectum {500} agentem nostram actionem propriam, necesse est ut
intellectus agens sit orma in nobis. . . . Et cum ita sit, necesse est ut homo intelligat per
intellectum sibi proprium omnia entia, et ut agat actionem sibi propriam in omnibus entibus,
sicut intelligit per intellectum qui est in habitu, quando uerit continuatus cum ormis
ymaginabilibus, omnia entia intellectione propria” (Taylor, trans., ong Commentary on the
De Anima, 399 {499-500}. On this text and its importance in the thought o Aquinas, see
Taylor, “Intellect as Intrinsic Formal Cause in the Soul according to Aquinas and Averroes.”
43
This principle and its use by Aquinas is something I have discussed elsewhere: Taylor,
“The Agent Intellect as ‘ orm or us’ and Averroes’s Critique o al-F~r~b§.”
44
For example, see Taylor, trans., ong Commentary on the De Anima, 356 {439}.
45
See my “Intelligibles in act in Averroes,” in Brenet, ed., Averroès et les averroïsmes juif
et latin. 111-40. There I identi ied the understanding o Themistius as Neoplatonic. H. J.
Blumenthal argues against the in luence o that tradition in his “Themistius, the Last
Peripatetic Commentator on Aristotle?”, in Arktouros, Hellenic Studies presented to Bernard
42
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of De Anima of Aristotle, Themistius held that the Productive /
Agent Intellect is “actual intellect” and “has all the orms all
together and presents all o them to itsel at the same time” such
that its essence is activity.46 However, or Themistius the human
actual intellect does not have o itsel the intellectual power or
abstraction but rather must be empowered by combining with,
being taken over by, or being illuminated by the transcendent
Productive or Agent Intellect in order to come to exist in the soul
as united with the potential intellect.47 Abstraction or separation
o the intelligible in potency takes place when the Productive /
Agent Intellect penetrates and takes over the human actual
intellect such that intelligibles in potency can be converted to
intelligibles in act.48 In contrast, Averroës ollows the Arabic
M. W. Knox on the occasion of his 65th birthday, ed. Glen W. Bowersock and others (Berlin,
1979), 391-400; see a revised version under the same title in Aristotle Transformed. The
Ancient Commentators and Their Influence, ed. Richard Sorabji (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell
University Press, 1990), 113-23. In this latter version, Blumenthal adds a brie discussion o
the arguments o E. P. Mahoney in avor o identi ying Neoplatonic language and notions in
the thought o Themistius on the relationship o the human intellect and the transcendent
Productive Intellect. See Mahoney’s “Themistius and the Agent Intellect in James o Viterbo
and Other Thirteenth-Century Philosophers,” Augustiniana 23 (1973): 423-67. For other
articles by Mahoney touching on this issue, see Blumenthal, “Themistius, the Last Peripatetic
Commentator on Aristotle?” (1990), 119-21 and the notes there. I discuss the role o the
Paraphrase of the De Anima by Themistius in the thought o Averroes at greater length in
“Themistius and the Development o Averroes’ Noetics.”
46
Themistius, In ibros Aristotelis De Anima Paraphrasis, ed. R. Heinze, Commentaria in
Aristotelem Graeca 5.3 (Berlin: G. Reimeri, 1899), 100.20-21; Themistius, On Aristotle’s On
the Soul, trans. Robert B. Todd (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1996), 124. An Arabic
Translation of Themistius’ Commentary on Aristotle's De Anima, ed. M. C. Lyons (Columbia,
S.C., and Ox ord: Bruno Cassirer Publishers Ltd.,1973), 181.12-13. This view may have also
served the purpose o assuring that the abstractions made by individuals on the basis o sense
perception and subsequent images ormed in the soul are in accord with one another and the
orms as in the Productive Intellect, though Themistius does not make explicit mention o
this.
47
See Themistius, In ibros Aristotelis De Anima Paraphrasis, Heinze, ed., 98.19-24
(Todd, trans., 122; Lyons, ed., 172-74); Heinze, ed., 99.6-10 (Todd, trans., 123; Lyons, ed.,
179.6-9; and Heinze, ed., 103.30-33 (Todd, trans., 128-29; Lyons, ed., 188.12-14).
48
Themistius writes that “. . . the productive intellect settles into the whole o the
potential intellect, as though the carpenter and the smith did not control their wood and
bronze externally but were able to pervade it totally. For this is how the actual intellect too
is added to the potential intellect and becomes one with it” (In ibros Aristotelis De Anima
Paraphrasis, Heinze, ed., 99.15-18 [Todd, trans., 123; Lyons, ed., 179.14-17]).
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tradition in holding that there is a single transcendent Agent
Intellect and did not give serious consideration to the notion that
each human being has his or her own particular abstracting agent
or actual intellect. Also unlike Themistius, Averroës does not
consider the Agent Intellect to unction as containing all orms.49
Still, Averroës does ind in Themistius this notion o the Agent
Intellect unctioning intrinsically in the human soul and describes
this as the Agent Intellect acting as “ orm or us” in such as a way
that it is not only an e icient cause in abstraction but is actually in
us as orm, such that it is we who are abstracting and knowing,
thanks to its presence and activity which is intrinsic to the soul.50
49
That the Productive / Agent Intellect contains all the orms I understand rom the
remarks o Themistius that (1) the potential intellect is moved to think only by an intellect
that thinks all things (In ibros Aristotelis De Anima Paraphrasis, Heinze, ed., 103.31-32
[Todd, trans., 128; Lyons, ed., 188.12-13]); (2) “the intellect that illuminates in a primary
sense is one” (In ibros Aristotelis De Anima Paraphrasis, Heinze, ed., 103.32 [Todd, trans.,
128-29; Lyons, ed., 188.13-14]); (3) “we who are combined rom the potential and the actual
[intellects] are re erred back to one productive intellect, and that what it is to be each o us
is derived rom that single [intellect]” (In ibros Aristotelis De Anima Paraphrasis, Heinze, ed.,
103.36-38 [Todd, trans., 129; Lyons, ed., 188.18-189.1]); (4) “we would not understand one
another unless there were a single intellect in which we all shared” (In ibros Aristotelis De
Anima Paraphrasis, Heinze, ed., 104.2-3 [Todd, trans., 129; Lyons, ed., 189.3]); and (5)
“divine intellect, which is separate and exists in actuality, thinks none o the enmattered
orms” but thinks only separate orms “continuously and perpetually” (In ibros Aristotelis
De Anima Paraphrasis, Heinze, ed., 114.34-115.9 [Todd, trans., 141; Lyons, ed., 209.16210.10]). For a recent discussion o these issues in Themistius, see Myrna Gabbe, “Themistius
on Concept Acquisition and Knowledge o Essences,” Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie
92 (2010): 215-35.
50
Taylor, trans., ong Commentary on the De Anima, 356 {445}. Averroës seems to have
read Themistius’s Paraphrasis 99.11 . (Heinze, ed.; Todd, trans., 123.25 .; Lyons, ed.,
179.9 .) as identi ying the actual intellect with the Agent Intellect. For the Middle
Commentary that seems clearly to be the case. See Averroës, Middle Commentary on
Aristotle's De Anima. A Critical Edition of the Arabic Text with English Translation, Notes and
Introduction, ed. and trans. Al red L. Ivry (Provo, Utah: Brigham Young University Press,
2002), 117.8-10. There he writes, “You ought to know that Themistius and most
commentators regard the intellect in us (al-caql alladh§ f§-n~) as composed o the intellect
which is in potency (al-caql bil-quwah) and the intellect which is in act (al-caql alladh§ bil-ficl),
that is, the Agent Intellect (al-caql al-facc~l). In a certain way it is composite and does not think
its essence but thinks what is here, when the imaginative intentions are joined to it. The
intelligibles perish due to the passing away o these intentions, orgetting and error thus
occurring to [our intellect]. They interpret Aristotle’s statement in this manner, as explained
in our commentary on his discourse.”
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The same is the case or the receptive Material Intellect as well.
According to Averroës, intellectual understanding involves not just
abstraction but also the reception o the intelligible trans erred
rom the mode o being o an intelligible in potency to the mode
o being o an intelligible in act. Inso ar as the intelligible in act is
no longer a determinate particular but rather an immaterial
intelligible, it requires an immaterial subject to receive it. This
subject is the Material Intellect which is shared by all human
beings simply because there must be one set o intelligibles in act
shared by all human beings or common knowledge, science and
discourse, another notion taken rom Themistius by Averroës.51
Hence, the philosophical ramework within which Averroës
conceptualizes the Agent Intellect as “ orm or us” is one that
permits a transcendent and extrinsic power o an essential sort (the
power o intellectual abstraction and understanding) to be shared
in an intrinsic way. Averroës recognized and rejected or himsel
what he perceived to be Platonic elements such as recollection and
a presence o orms outside the soul (in the Productive / Active
Intellect) in the thought o Themistius.52 Yet Aristotle’s account o
the separate, una ected, unmixed, and essentially active Agent
Intellect (De anima 3.5.430a17-18), required that the Agent
51
“There need be no wonder that we all are as a group composites o what is in potency
and o what is in act. All o us whose existence is by virtue o this one are re erred back to a
one which is the Agent Intellect. For i not this, then whence is it that we possess known
sciences in a shared way? And whence is it that the understanding o the primary de initions
and primary propositions is alike [ or us all] without learning? For it is right that, i we do not
have one intellect in which we all share, then we also do not have understanding o one
another” (my translation). C . Lyons, ed., 188.17-189.4. This corresponds to Heinze, ed.,
103.36-104.3; Todd, trans., 129: “There is no need to be puzzled i we who are combined
rom the potential and the actual [intellects] are re erred back to one productive intellect, and
that what it is to be each o us is derived rom that single [intellect]. Where otherwise do the
notions that are shared (koinoi ennoiai) come rom? Where is the untaught and identical
understanding o the primary de initions and primary axioms derived rom? For we would
not understand one another unless there were a single intellect that we all shared.”
52
“Et debes scire quod nulla di erentia est secundum expositionem Themistii et
antiquorum expositorum, et opinionem Platonis in hoc quod intellecta existentia in nobis sunt
eterna, et quod addiscere est rememorari” (“You ought to know that there is no di erence
between the exposition o Themistius and the other ancient commentators and the opinion
o Plato in regard to the act that the intelligibles existing in us are eternal and that learning
is recollection” [Taylor, trans., ong Commentary on the De Anima, 361-62 {452}]).
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Intellect be in some way intrinsic to the human soul as an essential
part o the distinctive de inition o human being as rational. The
account which Averroës ultimately provides contains key
components rom Themistius, in particular (1) the essential
combining, uniting, or sharing (scil., participating) o human
intellect in the intellectual activity o abstraction o the
transcendent, external, and ontologically distinct Agent Intellect,
inso ar as the Agent Intellect is “in the soul” and “ orm or us”
such that we are active by will and essentially in the production o
our own intellectual understanding; and (2) the notion that there
must be a single collection o intelligibles in act shared by all
human beings. For Averroës the requirements that we be the
agents in our thinking and that the power by which we think be
intrinsic yielded the conclusion that the Agent Intellect must be
present as our proper orm or these activities to take place. That
is, the very nature and actuality o the transcendent Agent Intellect
must be shared or participated by us essentially in the ullness o
its intellectual power or abstraction and understanding, though
Averroës does not use the language o participation to describe
this. The same presence in the soul is required or the receptive
Material Intellect as well.
II. AQUINAS AND THE REJECTED MODELS FROM THE
ARABIC / ISLAMIC PHILOSOPHICAL TRADITION
A) al-F~r~b§ and Ibn B~jja / Avempace
At the beginning o his response in the article in question,53
Aquinas immediately asserts that the Christian view that “the
ultimate end o human li e is the vision o God” should be
understood to be precisely parallel with the assertion o the
philosophers “that the ultimate happiness o human beings is to
understand substances separate in being rom matter.”54 For there
53
IV Sent., d. 49, q. 2, a. 1 [22723]: “Responsio. Dicendum quod . . . peruenire quod
Deum per essentiam uideat”
54
Ibid. [22723]: “ultimam hominis elicitatem esse intelligere substantias separatas a
materia secundum esse.”
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are philosophers as well as theologians who hold that the “vision
o God in his essence” is not possible. From among the
philosophers, Aquinas cites the view o al-F~r~b§ recounted by
Averroës in the ong Commentary on De Anima. However, the
interpretation o al-F~r~b§ as conveyed by Averroës to Aquinas is
only partially correct on the issue o the involvement o the Agent
Intellect in human knowing, as I have noted. According to
Averroës, or al-F~r~b§ knowledge o intelligibles comes about
when the separately existing Agent Intellect acts as an extrinsic
e icient cause providing assistance to the human soul to enable
the trans erence o the intelligible in potency in the objects sensed
rom the level o particularity and intelligibility in potency to the
level o intelligible in act in the individual rational soul or intellect.
As Averroës—Aquinas’s sole source—views this, the account o alF~r~b§ is inadequate because the Agent Intellect remains an
extrinsic cause operating on the human soul. The notion o a
genuine abstraction o intelligibles rom sensory experience is
something adopted by Averroës and, through Averroës, by
Aquinas, though Averroës does not properly recognize that or alF~r~b§ the action o abstraction is per ormed by the human being
with a power provided by the Agent Intellect.55
In this opening section o the response, however, Aquinas calls
attention to Averroës’ report o the doctrine purportedly set orth
by al-F~r~b§ in his lost Commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics.
Averroës writes, “For in his Commentary on the Nicomachean
Ethics [al-F~r~b§] seems to deny that there is conjoining with the
separate intelligences. He says that this is the opinion o Alexander
and that it should not be held that the human end is anything but
theoretical per ection.”56 That is, according to this report, which

55

In this matter Aquinas is in act in agreement with al-F~r~b§ in signi icant ways, inso ar
as Aquinas holds that the light or power o intellectual abstraction is given to human beings
by a transcendent extrinsic power and that this power as an intrinsic part o the rational soul
makes intellectual abstraction and understanding possible. For Aquinas this light o the
intellect or power o intellectual understanding, the agent intellect, while naturally present
in each human rational soul in the powers o active intellect and possible intellect, is
nevertheless a likeness o and a participation in the divine intellectual light o God.
56
Taylor, trans., ong Commentary on the De Anima, 346 {433}.
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came to Averroës through Ibn B~jja,57 al-F~r~b§ denied that a
genuine conjoining with the Agent Intellect in an immaterial
noetic identity is possible, since such a thing would require that
the human rational soul as a generated and corruptible entity
change its substance and become eternal and ungenerated.58
Hence, as Aquinas recounts rom his reading o Averrroës, alF~r~b§ is reported to have denied that human beings are able to
attain to the noetic conjunction and identity indicated in the
intellectual understanding o separate substances. In the irst
section o his response Aquinas then remarks, “Likewise some
theologians have asserted that the human intellect can never attain
to the vision o God in his essence,” re erring both to those who
ollow the Eastern Christian accounts and those who ollow the
analysis o knowing in Avicenna.59
Immediately therea ter,60 Aquinas characterizes this as a view
shared by al-F~r~b§ and those theologians on account o “the
distance between our intellect and the divine essence or other
separate substances.” While citing Chrysostom or the theological
position, Aquinas continues to analyze the issue in the
epistemological and metaphysical terms o the philosophers. He
writes regarding the issue motivating al-F~r~b§’s denial o the
understanding o separate substances that “it seems di icult or
the created intellect to become [fiat] the uncreated essence in some
way.” That is, it is problematic to think that there is a complete
noetic identity o knower and known in an immaterial knowing
when that would entail the trans ormation o a human being rom
a generated and corruptible entity into an immaterial and,
consequently, imperishably eternal entity.

57

See Harvey, “The Place o the Philosopher in the City according to Ibn B~jjah.”
Averroës several times discusses al-F~r~b§’s change late in li e to the view that the human
immortality through intellectual conjoining is “an old wives’ tale.” See Averroës’ remarks in
Epistle 1 in Averroès. a béatitude de l’âme. Editions, traductions et études, ed. and trans.
Marc Geo roy and Carlos Steel (Paris: Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin, 2001), 220; and
Epistle 2 (ibid., 230).
59
See Torrell, “La vision de Dieu ‘per essentiam’ selon Saint Thomas d’Aquin,” 178-85.
60
IV Sent., d. 49, q. 2, a. 1 [22723]: “Et utrosque ad hoc mouet distantia . . .
quarumcumque substantiarum separatarum.”
58
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Aquinas’s re utation o this view in ollowing section61 cites De
videndo deum by Maurus Magnentius Rabanus (d. 856) under the
name o Augustine as an authority in support o the contrary view
that there is vision o the divine essence. However, the rest o his
analysis is purely philosophical. Inso ar as intellectual understanding is the proper operation o human beings, the happiness
o human beings must result rom this operation. (This is simply
based on the teleological account in the Function Argument rom
Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics 10.7). But i per ection o
understanding in an Aristotelian noetic identity o knower and
known does not reach the divine essence, then it is not God but
something else in which human happiness consists. The latter is in
act the doctrine o al-F~r~b§, Avicenna, and Averroës, all o
whom hold that ultimate human happiness is ound in an
intellectual understanding reaching the level o the Agent Intellect,
or reaching the Agent Intellect itsel , or involving the intrinsic
presence o the Agent Intellect and the Material Intellect in the
human soul. For Aquinas, however, that view is absurd “since the
ultimate per ection o anything is in the conjoining with its
principle,”62 that is, a return and a reverting to its principle. In this
case, ultimate per ection can only be ound in a complete
reversion to the irst acting principle (principium effectivum), God.
This Neoplatonic philosophical principle o procession and return,
which Aquinas ound in Dionysius and elsewhere,63 he appeals to
theologically by citing the Book o Revelation, chapter 22, verse
13: “I am the Alpha and the Omega,” in the divisio textus in his
commentary on the second distinction o book 1 o the Sentences.
There he writes, “Consideration o this doctrine will be
concerning things inso ar as they proceed [exeunt] rom God as
rom a principle, and inso ar as they are brought back into him as

61

Ibid. [22723]: “Set hec positio omnino stare non potest . . . in ine eas possimus
intelligere.”
62
Ibid. [22723]: “cum ultima per ectio cuiuslibet sit in coniunctione ad suum principium.”
63
The literature on this subject is vast. For an example, see Paul Rorem, “‘Procession and
Return’ in Thomas Aquinas and his Predecessors,” The Princeton Seminary Review 13 (1992):
147-63.
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to the end.”64 By contrast, the appeal to this idea in the context o
the article we are considering rom book 4 o the Sentences
commentary is philosophical, not theological. Both al-F~r~b§ and
the Christian theologians are wrong in thinking that that the
human soul cannot attain to the vision o God and the reason is
this principle o procession and return.
Next,65 expressing his own view that the vision o the divine
essence can occur or our intellect, just as some o the philosophers say the human intellect can have vision o separate
substances, Aquinas now cites the doctrine o al-F~r~b§ (here his
positive view, not the skeptical view ascribed to his lost
Commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics) and Ibn B~jja /
Avempace on the nature and end o abstraction. In what ollows
Aquinas orms his account rom the critical analysis by Averroës
o the role o imagination in the thought o al-F~r~b§ and Ibn
B~jja. Each o these philosophers had asserted that subsequent to
sense perception the imagination provides orms or intellectual
abstraction and separation rom material conditions such that
“what results is the understood quiddity which is one and the
same or diverse understanding <human beings>.” 66 Drawing on
Averroës’ analysis o abstraction in Ibn B~jja, Aquinas writes that
“when our intellect reaches the highest abstraction o any
intelligible quiddity, it understands by this the quiddity o the
separate substance which is like it.”67
Aquinas’s discussion o the role and nature o abstraction in the
thought o Ibn B~jja, again based solely on the ong Commentary
by Averroës, continues in the next section68 where he explains Ibn
B~jja’s abstractive theory o ascension, as it were proceeding up
through abstractive quidditative ormalities until it reaches a
64

“consideratio huius doctrinae de rebus secundum quod exeunt a Deo ut a principio, et
secundum quod re eruntur in ipsum ut in inem” (Mandonnet, ed., 57).
65
IV Sent., d. 49, q. 2, a. 1 [22723].
66
Ibid. [22723]: “remanet quidditas intellecta que est una et eadem apud diuersos
intelligentes.”
67
Ibid. [22723]: “quando intellectus noster peruenit ad summam abstractionem quidditatis
intelligibilis cuiuscumque, intelligit per hoc quidditatem substantie separate que est ei similis.”
C . Taylor, trans., ong Commentary on the De Anima, 391 . {490 .}; ibid., 338-39 {424}.
68
IV Sent., d. 49, q. 2, a. 1 [22723].
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quiddity that is ultimate and rom which no urther quiddity can
be abstracted. For Ibn B~jja himsel the intellectual exercise o
orming and knowing abstractions o various sorts in language,
natural philosophy, mathematics, and metaphysics leads to a unity
with the Agent Intellect. The purpose o or end served by
intellectual understanding is conjunction and unity with the Agent
Intellect— rom which perhaps can come a higher unity with God,
the True One. Aquinas rejects this approach,69 ounded on merely
the exercise o human intellectual powers o abstraction, simply
because the ratio or ormal content o an abstracted material
substance, let us say o a horse or any number o any other
material quiddities, is not o the same ratio or ormal content as
a separately existing intellectual substance, an entity o a
completely di erent sort. The exercise o intellectual abstraction
based on material substances cannot lead to the knowledge o an
entity that is essentially immaterial—that is, it cannot lead to the
quiddity o a separate substance and cannot lead to “above all the
divine essence which is o a ratio altogether di erent rom every
created quiddity.”70 (In this Ibn B~jja himsel is in agreement,
though Aquinas apparently cannot see this, through the account
he has rom Averroës.)
Aquinas rejects the same approach in the next part71 again on
philosophical grounds since, according to the Porphyrian Tree, the
only likeness o ratio or ormality between a material substance
and an immaterial substance would be the remote genus o
substance which is said o both. But this is knowledge only in a
remote and quali ied way without apprehension o distinctive
de ining di erence. He writes, “Consequently, to know God or
other separate substances in this way is not to see the divine
essence or the quiddity o a separate substance but it is to know
through the e ect and as it were in a mirror.”72 Abstraction alone,
69

Ibid. [22723].
Ibid. [22723]: “precipue diuinam essentiam que maxime est alterius rationis ab omni
quidditate creata.”
71
Ibid. [22723].
72
Ibid. [22723]: “Vnde sic cognoscere Deum uel alias substantias separatas non est uidere
essentiam diuinam uel quidditatem substantie separate, set est cognoscere per e ectum et
quasi in speculo.”
70
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then, cannot garner o itsel anything beyond the nature o what
constitute the primary objects or abstraction. Rather, such
abstraction remains an understanding o an e ect, not o the very
essence o the cause o that e ect which is sought in this context.
In this Aquinas is in act in agreement with Ibn B~jja though they
deal with the consequences quite di erently. For Ibn B~jja this
means that Aristotelian abstraction should be rejected and that a
orm o Platonism involving the attainment o unity with the
Agent Intellect is the only way or the human soul to achieve the
ullness o knowledge o intelligible orms.73
B) Avicenna
The second rejected model is that o Avicenna who speaks o
intelligibles in act being emanated rom the separate intellects—the
Agent Intellect, to be precise—and impressed upon the human
rational soul. Aquinas, however, concerns himsel not with this
problem but rather only with the account o the Agent Intellect as
emanating orm to individual human rational souls when he writes
in the ollowing section74 that, according to Avicenna, “the
separate substances are understood by us through the intentions o
their quiddities which are certain likenesses o them not abstracted
rom them—because they are themselves immaterial—but
impressed by these on our souls.”75 The point here is that the
73
See the account o Genequand in his introduction to Ibn Bajja (Avempace), a conduite
de l’ isolé et deux autres épitres, 53-82.
74
IV Sent., d. 49, q. 2, a. 1 [22723].
75
Ibid. [22723]: “substantie separate intelliguntur a nobis per intentiones suarum
quidditatum que sunt quedam ipsarum similitudines non abstracte ab eis, quia ipsemet sunt
immateriales, set impresse ab eis in animabus nostris.” Here Aquinas has in mind Avicenna
atinus. iber de Philosophia Prima sive Scientia Divine, I-V, ed. S. Van Riet, ed. (Louvain:
Peeters; Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1977), tract. 3, c. 8 (p. 162), where Avicenna writes regarding
knowledge o separate substances, “Sed quia quod invenitur in nobis de illis est impressiones
quae assimilantur eis sine dubio, et hoc est nostra scientia de illis” (“But this is because what
is ound in us regarding these are impressions which are undoubtedly like these, and this
constitutes our knowledge o them”). This corresponds to Ibn S§n~, al-Shif~’. Al-Il~hiyy~t, vol.
1, ed. G. C. Anawati and Sa’id Zayed (Cairo: Organisation générale des imprimeries
gouvernementales, 1960), 144 (“Rather, rom these what exist or us undoubtedly are
in luences imitative o them and this is our knowledge [o them]”). I am glad to express my
thanks to Amos Bertolacci or help in locating this precise re erence.
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separate substances are understood through mediating likenesses
and not directly, according to Avicenna. Hence, the same will hold
regarding the knowledge o God who can be apprehended only
through a likeness and not directly.
Aquinas rejects76 this Avicennian approach because o the
principle that “everything which is received in something is in this
in the mode o the recipient,” which yields the problematic
consequence that “the likeness o the divine essence impressed by
it on our intellect will be through the mode o our intellect.” That
is, what will be in the human intellect will be imper ect and
diminished in accord with the mode and nature o our imper ect
human intellects, not in accord with the divine essence as it is in
itsel . In this way even i the ratio or ormal notion o the divine
essence is present to the human intellect, it will be present there
not as it is in itsel but rather in accord with the recipient’s own
incomplete and weaker mode o per ection, as i the human
intellect were to have in it a small bit o whiteness in regard to
what has in itsel a great deal o whiteness. Aquinas adds77 that this
Avicennian way is said to be inadequate i it attains only the ratio
o the genus, as discussed earlier, and it is inadequate i “it
concerns the same ratio o the genus but only according to
analogy.” Here Aquinas’s concern is more clearly expressed when
he writes,
Similarly, to the extent that the intellect understands some quiddity, it is
necessary that the likeness o its ratio in species come to be in us, although
perhaps the mode o being or each is not the same. For the orm existing in
intellect or in sense is not the principle o knowing according to the mode o
being it has in each, but according to the ratio in which it shares with the exterior
thing. In this way it is evident that there is no likeness received in the created
intellect by which God can in this way be understood such that his essence is seen
immediately. Hence, also, some asserting that the divine essence is seen only
through this mode said that the essence itsel is not seen but some brightness, as
i a ray o it.78
76

IV Sent., d. 49, q. 2, a. 1 [22723].
Ibid. [22723].
78
Ibid. [22723]: “Et similiter ad hoc quod intellectus intelligat aliquam quidditatem,
oportet quod iat in eo similitudo eiusdem rationis secundum speciem, quamuis orte non sit
idem modus essendi utrobique.
77
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That is, to see God “ ace-to- ace” or to understand the divine
essence is to apprehend it immediately in a way that requires that
there be no mediating likeness as ound in the epistemology o
Avicenna, an epistemology that might be termed a sort o
representationalism. Any mediating likeness as something created
will be a representation and not the divine essence itsel .
C) The Model Adopted from the Arabic / Islamic Philosophical
Tradition: Alexander and Averroës
Aquinas goes on79 to set orth his own doctrine, explicitly
stating that he is drawing on the views o Alexander o
Aphrodisias and Averroës as ound in book 3 o the ong
Commentary on De Anima by Averroës. He begins by reviewing
the philosophical principles that must be respected in the account.
First, the orm apprehended in cognition o immaterial separate
substances cannot be derived by abstraction based on apprehension o composite material substances. What is known in such
abstraction cannot be more than what is present in the
apprehended composite material substances, a position Aquinas
shares with Ibn B~jja, as mentioned earlier. For, in that case what
is known would not be the separate substance but rather the
composite determinate material substances and their nature, the
starting points and oundations o the abstraction. Second, i a
separate substance is to be known in its essence, it cannot be
known through the mediation o a representative impression
caused by a separate substance, or that would not be direct
knowledge o the essence but rather knowledge o something
created. Hence, as Aquinas puts it, “Rather, it is the separate

“Non enim orma existens in intellectu uel sensu est principium cognitionis secundum
modum essendi quem habet utrobique, set secundum rationem in qua communicat cum re
exteriori. Et ita patet quod per nullam similitudinem receptam in intellectu creato potest Deus
intelligi ita quod essentia eius uideatur immediate. Vnde etiam quidam ponentes diuinam
essentiam solum per hunc modum uideri, dixerunt quod ipsa essentia non uidebitur, set
quidam ulgor quasi radius ipsius.”
79
IV Sent., d. 49, q. 2, a. 1 [22723].

538

RICHARD C. TAYLOR

substance itsel which is conjoined to our intellect as orm, so that
it is what is understood and that by which it is understood.”80
In the context o this discussion o knowing separate
substances, Aquinas reads Averroës’ doctrine as requiring that
separate intellects be both that by which we know (qua intelligitur)
the separate intellect, that is, that it be “ orm or us” as intrinsic to
the soul, and that it also be that which is known (quod intelligitur),
that is, the apprehended object o knowing. In the teachings o
Averroës this would correspond to the notion that the powers by
which knowing takes place (qua intelligitur) are the separate Agent
Intellect and the separate Material Intellect working together and
that which is known (quod intelligitur) are the intelligibles in act
in the separate Material Intellect. Phrased in another way, the
ormal and intrinsic power by which the activity o intellectual
understanding takes place are these cooperating separate intellects
and the objects o that intellectual understanding consist o
intelligibles in act in the Material Intellect. This is Averroës’
account o natural human knowing, an account very di erent
rom that o Aquinas, who holds that these intellects are in act
just powers o the individual soul and that the objects o
understanding are the natures o things in the world.81 In taking
over this model, Aquinas understands God’s very own divine
essence as that by which we understand (corresponding to the
Agent Intellect or, better, the Agent Intellect and Material Intellect
working together) through a conjoining and also as that very thing
which is understood (corresponding to the abstracted intelligibles
that come to exist in the Material Intellect).82 That is to say, in
80

Ibid. [22723]: “set est ipsa substantia separata que coniungitur intellectui nostro ut
orma, ut ipsa sit quod hic intelligitur et qua intelligitur.”
81
For Averroës the Material Intellect and the Agent Intellect are principles philosophically
discovered by the analysis o human cognition rather than direct objects o human intellectual
experience. What is experienced by human beings is the apprehension o intelligibles in act
that constitutes science in the human theoretical intellect. For the human individual,
knowledge o these two intellects comes not by some direct perception as such but rather
through a complex reasoned account.
82
IV Sent., d. 49, q. 2, a. 1 [22723]: “[E]st ipsa substantia separata que coniungitur
intellectui nostro ut orma, ut ipsa sit quod hic intelligitur et qua intelligitur.”
Objection 15 o this article [22715] contends that “in heaven God is seen through a
medium which is the light o glory [lumen glorie], as is clear in Psalm 35, 10: we will see the
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natural knowing or Averroës the Agent Intellect comes to be
“ orm or us,” empowering the human being to come to have
intellectual understanding thanks to aid rom outside; in
corresponding ashion, or Aquinas in supernatural knowing it is
God who comes rom outside to be ormally present in the soul,
enhancing its power o understanding as “ orm or us” in our
inite knowing o the divine essence. As Averroës did not hold that
the very substance o the Agent Intellect came ontologically into
the human soul to become the very substance o the human soul,
so too or Aquinas the divine essence itsel does not come to exist
ontologically in the human soul, replacing the human substance
light in your light. There ore he will not be seen in his essence.” Aquinas responds [22738]
by distinguishing three media in bodily and intellectual vision, concluding that God is
immediately present to the human intellect as that which gives the elevated power o
cognizing to the human intellect and as the unmediated object cognized. “To the i teenth
objection it should be said that the medium in bodily vision and intellectual [vision] is ound
to be three old. The irst is the medium under which it is seen; this is what per ects vision or
seeing in general, not determining vision to some special object, as bodily light is related to
bodily vision and the light o the agent intellect to the possible intellect. The second is the
medium by which it is seen; this is the visible orm by which each power o vision is
determined to a special object, as by the orm o the stone or cognizing the stone. The third
is the medium in which it is seen. This is that through the inspection o which sight is brought
to another thing, as by inspecting a mirror one is led to these things which are represented in
the mirror and by seeing the image one is led to the object imaged [in the mirror]. In this way
too through the cognition o the e ect the intellect is led to the cause, or the converse. In the
vision characteristic o heaven there will not be a third medium, as i God were cognized
through the species o other things, as He is now cognized by means o the ratio regarding
which we are said now to see in a mirror. Nor will there be there a second medium because
the very divine essence will be that by which our intellect will see God, as is evident rom
what has been said. But there will be there only the irst medium which will elevate our
intellect to this which can be conjoined with the uncreated essence in the way mentioned. But
by this medium a mediated cognition is not meant because it does not all between the
cognizer and the thing cognized, but rather it is that which gives to the one cognizing the
power o cognizing.” Though aspects o the idea have important scriptural and theological
antecedents, the term lumen gloriae can be traced to Albert the Great who seems to have
developed it out o his study o the works o Pseudo-Dionysius and his knowledge o
teachings in philosophical psychology in Avicenna and the Latin Christian theologians who
sought to use the Persian philosopher’s insights in their consideration o the soul and God.
See Nikolaus Wicki, Die ehre von der himmlischen Seligkeit in der mittelalterlichen
Scholastik von Petrus
ombardus bis Thomas von Aquin (Frank urt an Main:
Universitätsverlag Freiburg Schweiz, 1954), esp. 154 . Regarding the use and development
o Avicennian thought by Latin Christian theologians, see Magdalena Bieniak, The Soul-Body
Problem at Paris, ca. 1200-1250 (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 2010).
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with the divine. Regarding what is understood, or Averroës the
object o intellectual understanding is to be ound in the abstracted
intelligible as intelligible in act in the Material Intellect, though it
is garnered rom sensory experience o a nature instantiated in a
particular thing in the world; or Aquinas the object o intellectual
understanding is not the abstracted orm which is the intelligible
species, a likeness o the thing, but rather the nature o the thing
in the world.83 In the context o knowing God per essentiam or
ace-to- ace, God himsel substitutes or the intelligible species as
likeness and also the thing on which the likeness is based in
natural knowing since in supernatural knowing there is no
representative likeness but rather just God himsel .84
Aquinas goes on85 to insist that in the vision o God in his
essence that by which the vision takes place (qua intelligitur) must
be the divine essence itsel acting as an enhancing orm. He
stresses that this is not to be understood as in natural philosophy:
“It ought not to be understood as i the divine essence is the true
orm o our intellect or that out o this and our intellect simply
one thing is made, as in natural things made rom natural orm
and matter.”86 That is, the divine essence should not be
understood as becoming ontologically the very orm constituting
human intellect and carrying out the operation o intellectual
understanding. Were that the case, it would be God knowing God,
83

See II Sent., d. 2, q. 3, a. 1 [3792]: “in intellectu vero humano similitudo rei intellectae
est aliud a substantia intellectus, et est sicut orma ejus; unde ex intellectu et similitudine rei
e icitur unum completum, quod est intellectus in actu intelligens; et hujus similitudo est
accepta a re.”
84
Here Aquinas is content to set orth the basic doctrine and to indicate the help ulness
o the model rom Averroës and Alexander as explicated by Averroës. Later, in article 6 o this
question, Aquinas shows that the enhancing o the power o the soul in act requires irst the
bringing about o a disposition in the soul or the reception o the vision o God. As Katja
Krause has indicated in her 30 May 2012 presentation at the con erence The Sentences of
ombard and the Commentary of Aquinas held at the Institut Catholique de Paris, in article
6 Aquinas begins to turn to the noetics o Alexander to provide a uller account o the new
disposition given to the soul in the light o glory by God so that he may be seen per essentiam,
albeit not comprehensively.
85
IV Sent., d. 49, q. 2, a. 1 [22723].
86
Ibid. [22723]: “Quod quidem non debet intelligi, quasi diuina essentia sit uera orma
intellectus nostri uel quod ex ea et intellectu nostro e iciatur unum simpliciter, sicut in
naturalibus ex orma et materia naturali.”
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not a blessed human being in heaven knowing God ace-to- ace.
Instead, he writes,
Rather, [it should be understood to come about] because the relation o the
divine essence to our intellect is as the relation o orm to matter. For whenever
there are any two things o which one is more per ect than the other and these
are received in the same recipient, there is a relation o one o the two to the
other, namely, o the more per ect to the less per ect, as is the relation o orm
to matter.87

It is not inappropriate to use the language o matter and orm to
characterize the per ection o one thing by another. Aquinas takes
this principle rom several passages in Averroës’
ong
Commentary, among them the ollowing two.
For with respect to every activity which has come to be rom the gathering
together o two di erent things, it is necessarily the case that one o those two
be as it were matter and instrument and the other be as it were orm or agent.
The intellect in us, there ore, is composed o the intellect which is in a positive
disposition and the agent intellect, either in such a way that the propositions are
as it were matter and the agent intellect is as it were orm, or in such a way that
the propositions are as it were the instrument and the agent intellect is as it were
the e icient [cause]. For the disposition is similar in this case.88
When this conjoining in us between the agent intellect and the material intellect
has been established, we will be able to ind out the way in which we say that the
agent intellect is similar to orm and that the intellect which is in a positive
disposition (in habitu) is similar to matter. For in regard to any two things o
which one is the subject and the second is more actual than the other, it is
necessary that the relation o the more actual to the less actual be as the relation
o orm to matter. With this intention we say that the proportion o the irst

87
Ibid. [22723]: “Set quia proportio essentie diuine ad intellectum nostrum est sicut
proportio orme ad materiam. Quandocumque enim aliqua duo quorumunum est altero
per ectius, recipiuntur in eodem receptibili, proportio unius ad alterum, scilicet magis per ecti
ad minus per ectum, est sicut proportio orme ad materiem.”
88
Taylor, trans., ong Commentary on the De Anima, 397 {497}: “Et omnis actio acta
ex congregato duorum diversorum, necesse est ut alterum duorum illorum sit quasi materia
et instrumentum, et aliud sit quasi orma aut agens. Intellectus igitur qui est in nobis
componitur ex intellectu qui est in habitu et intellectu agenti, aut ita quod propositiones sunt
quasi materia et intellectus agens est quasi orma, aut ita quod propositiones sunt quasi
instrumentum et intellectus agens est quasi e iciens; dispositio enim in hoc est consimilis.”
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actuality o the imaginative power to the irst actuality o the common sense is
as the proportion o orm to matter.89

For Aquinas the divine essence must not completely displace
the power o the human intellect in an ontological way; instead,
the human intellect, itsel a ormal power o the soul, receptive in
relation to the enhancing intellectual power o the divine essence,
inds the divine essence to be present in it (inhabitans,
“indwelling,” albeit not literally as i ontologically identical) as a
supernatural actualizing power by which the divine essence can be
seen as object. Aquinas states that the model or this is ound in
Averroës and Alexander inso ar as they speak o the Agent
Intellect as being “in the soul” (again, as does Aristotle in De
Anima 3.5.430a13: en t‘ psuch‘) as a orm acting in intellection
and as a separate substance apprehended by that intellection.90
This is the notion o acquired intellect in Alexander, the notion
that in intellectual understanding the perishable human soul comes
to have acting in it, with the power o intellectuality, the Agent
Intellect itsel , which or Alexander is God. In the case o Averroës
as understood here by Aquinas, it means that it is not necessary
that the ormality by which intellectual understanding takes place
(qua intelligitur) be solely intrinsic; rather, it is reasonable to hold
that a separately existing immaterial substance can be the power
by which intellectual understanding takes place.
In the inal section o Aquinas’s response,91 he spells out this
philosophical account o how the divine essence is orm or the
89
Ibid., 398 {499}: “Et cum uerit veri icata nobis hec continuatio que est inter
intellectum agentem et intellectum materialem, poterimus reperire modum secundum quem
dicimus quod intellectus agens similis est orme et quod intellectus qui est in habitu similis est
materie. Omnia enim duo quorum subiectum est unum, et quorum alterum est per ectius alio,
necesse est ut respectus per ectioris ad imper ectius sit sicut respectus orme ad materiam. Et
secundum hanc intentionem dicimus quod proportio prime per ectionis virtutis ymaginative
ad primam per ectionem communis sensus et sicut proportio orme ad materiam.”
90
Note that what is accepted rom Alexander and Averroës or the description o the
supernatural enhancement o the human intellect in patria is the notion o “ orm or us”
which or them described an enhancement required or natural human knowing. Aquinas by
no means accepts their shared view that the individual human soul perishes with the death o
the body.
91
IV Sent., d. 49, q. 2, a. 1 [22723].
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human intellect by explicating the relevant principles supporting
this teaching. First, he explains that the notion that the ormal
power o intellectual understanding (“a orm by which the intellect
understands,” qua intelligitur) and the intellect itsel come to be
one in intellectual understanding (quod intelligitur) should be
understood as analogous to hylomorphism, the unity o orm and
matter which constitutes a single existing being. In this way there
is a single understanding o the divine essence on the part o the
human being which comes about when the divine essence is qua
intelligitur or, in the language o Averroës, “ orm or us,” in this
enhanced human intellectual understanding o quod intelligitur,
the object o understanding, the separate substance, the divine
essence itsel .
However, it is important to understand how the analogy alters
or is imper ect. In the case o natural things, what is subsistent—
the hylomorphic composite—cannot unction as the orm or
some other matter. Matter cannot be the orm o anything, and so
what is itsel a composite o orm and matter cannot also be the
orm or some other matter. But, argues Aquinas, or an
immaterial substance subsisting per se such as the human soul,
there is nothing in its principles precluding its becoming orm o
some matter and composite with that matter. Aquinas then states,
“However, in the case o the intellect, it is necessary that the
intellect in potency itsel be taken as matter and the intelligible
species as orm; the intellect understanding in act will be as
composed o each.”92 That is, the intellect itsel which is an
actuality and an immaterial orm can be considered inso ar as it
has potentiality or the reception o intelligible orms which will
per ect it in its ull actuality. This is what Aquinas calls the
possible intellect. This receptive intellect is able to receive another
orm, the intelligible species, in intellectual understanding, thereby
becoming “understanding in act” as “something composed o
each.” The reception o this orm urther actualizes and per ects
the human intellect, which becomes an intellect understanding in
92
Ibid. [22723]: “In intellectu autem oportet accipere ipsum intellectum in potentia quasi
materiam et speciem intelligibilem quasi ormam, et intellectus in actu intelligens erit quasi
compositum ex utroque.”
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act through that reception and per ection. Hence, in principle it
is not unthinkable that what is already an intellect be urther
actualized by another orm. In this way it is not unthinkable that
a transcendent immaterial orm come to be ormal and actual in
relation to another lower orm in a way analogous to the
per ecting and enhancing relationship o orm to matter. That is,
Aquinas is stating that there are two senses in which separate
substance can be “ orm or us.” The irst is as a supervening orm
and a ormal principle o understanding, in a ashion similar to
that in which Averroës has the separate Agent Intellect provide the
needed actuality or intellectual understanding by the individual.
The second sense is that by which the object apprehended comes
to be a known orm in the human being. In Averroës this was the
teaching that the abstracted orms come to exist in the separate
Material Intellect unctioning as their ontological subject, a subject
to which human beings are connected in intellectual understanding
through intelligibles abstracted but originally provided as
intelligibles in potency in the human imaginative power taken
broadly. For Aquinas, however, the object abstracted in natural
human cognition becomes the intelligible species in an individual
human mind which is not the object o knowledge itsel but a
means to knowing the objects o knowledge, the natures o the
things o the world.
Hence, we see that there are models showing how what is orm
and intellect can receive another orm and per ection. But how can
this be understood in the case o some immaterial subsisting
substance which is not in matter but is at once intelligible and
intelligent? Aquinas states a principle rom Aristotle’s Metaphysics,
when he writes, “However, any given thing is intelligible inso ar
as it is in act, not inso ar as it is in potency, as is evident in Book
9 o Aristotle’s Metaphysics.”93 This Aquinas cites to set up his
93
The proper re erence is to Metaphysics 8.6 [1045b24]. However, Aquinas is ollowing
the text and interpretation ound in the Latin translation o Averroes’s ong Commentary on
the Metaphysics. The Arabic translation di ers considerably rom the Greek. Averroës
interprets it to mean that the immaterial separate entities moving the heavens, inso ar as they
are pure orms and actualities separate rom matter, are thereby per se intelligible as well as
intelligent. See Averroes Tafs§r m~ bacd al-t. ab§ ‘ah, ed. Maurice Bouyges, S.J., vol. 2 (Beirut:
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assertion that this doctrine can apply to the divine essence acting
in the human intellect. For “the divine essence is pure act.” Given
this, the divine essence must be pure intellect and hence capable
o being in the human intellect as its orm, as Averroës and
Alexander—as understood by Aquinas—assert is the case when the
human intellect is in the activity o intellectual understanding.
However, what is an immaterial orm per se is a orm which is
immediately intelligible per se. In this case there is no need or
abstraction and separation o the intelligible orm rom matter.
Hence, since the divine essence is itsel pure act, Aquinas
concludes that “it can be a orm by which the intellect
understands, and this will be the beati ic vision.”94 As J.-B. Brenet
has pointed out, in this case God is able to be present to the soul
in the same way that the intelligible species is present to the soul
as that by means o which science o worldly things is possessed.
However, in this case what is present in that ashion does not
require abstraction in order to be intelligible, since God is a pure
orm.95 Here Aquinas has passed beyond the accounts o
Alexander and Averroës to present his own teaching, or
Alexander did not propose that God is the direct apprehended
object o intellectual understanding, nor did Averroës assert that
there is direct intellectual cognition o the Agent or Material
Intellects. Hence, we ind Aquinas here using their teachings on
separate intellect as “ orm or us” in a way very di erent rom the
way they use it.

Dar al-Machreq Editeurs [Imprimerie Catholique], 19672), book 7~’, c. 16, p. 1102; Aristotelis
Metaphysicorum ibri XIIII cum Averrois Cordubensis in eosdem commentariis et epitome in
In Aristotelis Opera Cum Averrois Commentariis (Venice: Iunctas, 1574), vol. 8, VIII, c. 16,
. 225r F. On orm as the cause o actuality, see Metaphysics 8.2 [1043a19-21]. The cause o
actuality in a composite thing is the orm. See Averroes Tafs§r m~ bacd al-.tab§ ‘ah, book 7~’,
c. 7, p. 1055; Aristotelis Metaphysicorum ibri XIIII, VIII, c. 7, . 215v K. I discuss this in
“Averroes on Psychology and the Principles o Metaphysics,” The Journal of the History of
Philosophy 36 (1998): 507-23; see 519-21, especially 519 n. 41.
94
[22723] poterit esse forma qua intellectus intelligit. Et hec erit uisio beatificans.
95
See Brenet, “Vision béati ique et séparation de l’intellect.”
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IV. CONCLUSION
What we have seen here is the use o the thought o Averroës
and Alexander by Aquinas as he sets orth a philosophical
justi ication or the Christian theological doctrine o beatitude.
That justi ication was ound in Aquinas’s understanding o the
philosophical noetics o ordinary human intellectual understanding as set orth in the ong Commentary on De Anima by
Averroës. Other accounts, such as those o al-F~r~b§, Ibn B~jja,
and Avicenna were rejected as unsuitable models since they
involved either a denial o an intellectual understanding o
separate intellectual substance or a denial that such an intellectual
understanding can take place directly and without intermediate
representation.
Aquinas also expounds this doctrine and names Averroës
explicitly in disputed question 8 De Veritate (De cognitione
angelorum), article 1, entitled, “Whether the angels see God in his
essence.” There he reasons that beatitude consisting o the
intellectual vision o God is the most per ect operation o a
rational creature. Using the notion that the ultimate per ection o
anything involves its return to its principle, he explains that, since
aith teaches that God creates all rational creatures immediately,
“it is necessary according to aith that every rational creature who
reaches beatitude sees God in his essence.”96 He later mentions
Averroës (and not Alexander) as the source or the key notion,
writing
How a separate essence can be joined to the intellect as orm the Commentator
shows as ollows in Book 3 [o his commentary] on De Anima: whenever two
things one o which is more per ect97 than the other are received into something
able to receive [them], the proportion o the more per ect to the less per ect is as
the proportion o orm to what it is able to per ect, as light is the per ection o
color when both are received in a transparent [medium]. For this reason since the
created intellect which is present in a created substance is more imper ect than
96
“Unde oportet secundum idem ut omnis creatura rationalis quae ad beatitudinem
penrenit, per essentiam Deum videat” (Sancti Thomae de Aquino, Opera omnia, 22/2, editio
Leonina [Rome: Ad Sanctae Sabinae, 1972] 217.153-55).
97
And as such, more actual.
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the divine essence existing in it, the divine essence is compared in a certain way
as orm in relation to that which is understood.98

The doctrine o Aquinas remains the same in later works, so the
importance o Averroës or the ormation o Aquinas’s account o
beatitude persists even i unstated.99 However, as Brenet points
out, re erence to Averroës regarding this teaching disappears with
the Summa contra Gentiles.100
Yet it would seem that precisely the sort o epistemological
solution that Aquinas permits here or understanding the
intellectual understanding or seeing o God in his essence or “ aceto- ace” is the very epistemological solution he altogether rejects
in other works when analyzing the epistemology o Averroës.
Elsewhere Aquinas insists that the agent intellect and material
intellect cannot be separate in being because these powers o
knowing must be intrinsically present in the human knower, or
otherwise the knower would not be the human being but the
separate intellects.101 It is this problem to which several
98

De Verit., q. 8, a. 1: “Qualiter autem essentia separata possit coniungi intellectui ut
orma, sic ostendit Commentator in III De anima: quandocumque in aliquo receptibili
recipiuntur duo quorum unum est altero per ectius, proportio per ectioris ad minus per ectum
est sicut proportio ormae ad suum per ectibile, sicut lux est per ectio coloris cum ambo
recipiuntur in diaphano; et ideo cum intellectus creatus, qui inest substantiae creatae, sit
imper ectior divina essentia in eo existente, comparabitur divina essentia ad illum intellectum
quodam modo ut orma” (Leon. ed., 218.208-34).
99
See, or example, STh I, q. 12; I-II, qq. 1-5.
100
Brenet, “S’unir à l’intellect, voir Dieu,” 240. Brenet explains that in an early version
o the Summa contra Gentiles Aquinas mentions Averroës in connection with the issue o
beatitude but Aquinas chose to remove that re erence in the inal version.
101
For example, Summa Contra Gentiles, 2.59, 12: “Id quo aliquid operatur, oportet esse
ormam eius: nihil enim agit nisi secundum quod est actu; actu autem non est aliquid nisi per
id quod est orma eius; unde et Aristoteles probat animam esse ormam, per hoc quod animal
per animam vivit et sentit. Homo autem intelligit, et non nisi per intellectum: unde et
Aristoteles, inquirens de principio quo intelligimus, tradit nobis naturam intellectus possibilis.
Oportet igitur intellectum possibilem ormaliter uniri nobis, et non solum per suum
obiectum.” Summa contra gentiles (Rome: Typis Riccardi Garroni, 1918) [S. Thomae de
Aquino Opera Omnia Iussu eonis XIII P.M. edita Cura et studio Fratrum Praedicatorum
Tomus XIII], p. 415b Amplius. Texts such as this ound in a number o the works o Aquinas
are analyzed in my article, “Intellect as Intrinsic Formal Cause in the Soul according to
Aquinas and Averroes,” in The Afterlife of the Platonic Soul. Reflections on Platonic
Psychology in the Monotheistic Religions, ed. Maha El-Kaisy Friemuth and John M. Dillon
(Leiden: Brill, 2009), 187-220.
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ourteenth-century supporters o Aquinas called attention when
they raised the issue o whether his teaching is in contradiction to
his own critique o Averroës.102 For the present, I would suggest
that here the context and the purpose are di erent. In the
Commentary on the Sentences Aquinas is speaking o the
supernatural involvement o God in enabling a vision o the divine
essence by the blessed in patria, in the a terli e. The context is not
that o natural human knowing in via, in the course o li e in the
natural world. Hence, what we ind here is not so much a
contradiction to the critical rejection o Averroës’ view o natural
knowing in via that Aquinas vehemently set orth repeatedly, as
rather an instance where the “ orm or us” account Aquinas saw
in the natural accounts o Averroës and Alexander is ound by him
to be suitable as a model or understanding the non-natural,
indeed supernatural, vision o the divine essence promised or the
a terli e in Scripture as ultimate human beatitude. In the account
in the Commentary on the Sentences Aquinas is not
philosophically proving that the nature o the inal end o human
beings is the beati ic vision. That would require a much more
thoroughly argued teleological account. Rather, here Aquinas
begins with the Christian theological doctrine assumed as true by
aith and draws deeply on the Arabic and Greek philosophical
traditions to provide a consistent account o just how that
theological teaching may be understood cogently. As I see it, this
constitutes just another instance o the work o thinkers o the
Abrahamic tradition as they negotiate their way toward a more
thought ul conciliation o revealed religion and natural human
reason. The same is ound in very di ering ways in al-F~r~b§, Ibn
B~jja, Avicenna, and Averroës, even i their negotiations were
more rationalist in character than would likely suit Aquinas and
others o the Latin tradition. Still, all o these thinkers held or the
existence o one First Cause and Ultimate Principle o the universe
as God and each in his own way asserted that understanding o
that First Cause constitutes part or all o the end or human beings
and ultimate human happiness.
102

See Brenet, “Vision béati ique et séparation de l’intellect,”; Ermatinger,“Giles o Rome
and Anthony o Parma in an Anonymous Question on the Intellect.”
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Aquinas is the most well known, innovative, and insight ul
theologian and philosopher in Europe in the High Middle Ages
and in various ways his teachings and methods continue to nourish
theological and philosophical thought even today. However, it is
less broadly known and less well documented with precision that
the thought o Aquinas was very pro oundly in luenced by his
engagement with philosophical teachings arising originally in the
Arabic / Islamic philosophical tradition in such diverse places as
Baghdad, Cordoba, Cairo, and Bukhara. In each o these cities and
many others throughout the lands under the governance o
Muslim political leaders, the intellectual development o
philosophy and science continued with new analyses and
understandings o optics, medicine, mathematics, natural sciences,
and philosophical reasoning, not uncommonly with Muslims,
Christians, and Jews working together as teachers and students.
Philosophy and science as advanced in the Arabic / Islamic
tradition was oundational to the development o thought in
Europe through extensive translations at Toledo in Spain, at the
court o Frederick II in Sicily, and elsewhere.
Considered in this context, Aquinas has much in common with
the philosophical tradition ound in the Islamic world inso ar as
he worked to reconcile the power ul philosophical reasoning o
the Greek pagan tradition with the monotheism common to the
religions o the three Abrahamic traditions, as had philosophical
thinkers o Islamic, Jewish, and Christian traditions alive inside the
Islamic world. Viewed in this light, Aquinas as well as other
thinkers such as his teacher, Albert the Great, the Franciscan
Bonaventura, and many other Europeans can be seen as orming
their philosophical and theological views only through
participation in what is a common negotiation between secular
philosophy and science on the one hand and, on the other hand,
the common values and principles ound in the Abrahamic
traditions. The unproductive negative model o con lict, clash,
attack, and domination among representatives o the Islamic,
Christian, and Jewish philosophical traditions should be put aside
as inadequately descriptive o the historical reality. Thinkers o
these three traditions argued or their own understandings and
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against those o others both within and outside their aith traditions. Rigorous argument, disagreement, re utation, and de ense
o philosophical and theological positions were common and very
ruit ul methods used inside each o the three traditions and
should be seen as the methods by which philosophical and
theological understanding advanced in sophistication and insight.
The more appropriate and encompassing model is that o a
common endeavor by philosophers and philosophical theologians
o the three traditions to conciliate and reconcile secular science
with the common principles o Judaism, Islam and Christianity.

